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ABSTRACT. 
The paper explores the philosophical intelligibility of contemporary defences of 
collective political forgiveness against a background of sceptical doubt, both general 
and particular. Three genera sceptical arguments are examined: one challenges the 
idea that political collectives exist; another challenges the idea that moral agency 
can be projected upon political collectives; a final argument challenges the 
attribution of emotions, especially anger, to collectives. Each of these sceptical 
arguments is rebutted.  At a more particular level, the contrasts between individual 
forgiveness and collective forgiveness gives rise to various problems and the 
‘desiderata’ for their resolution - authority, specificity and temporal proximity - are 
briefly explored.  
1. Introduction. 
Forgiveness has traditionally been viewed as a process which involves an offender 
and a victim; it is viewed as a process in which the victim, in response to the 
repentance and apology of the offender, relinquishes the justified indignation 
previously directed at the offender. On such a construal forgiveness is moral 
because it involves the exercise of, or some approximation to the exercise of, a 
traditionally recognised moral virtue, the virtue of forgiveness; it is individual 
because it involves relations between two individuals, an offender and a victim; 
and it is temporally bounded because it might reasonably be expected to occur 
within the lifetime and within the living memory of offender and victim.  
More formally expressed: traditional forgiveness (F) involves three temporally 
distinct sequences of events (ti, tii, tiii) featuring an offender (O), and a victim (V). 
Thus: 
A victim (V) forgives (F) an offender (O) if and only if: 
(1) at ti O wrongs V, at which point warmth, respect and good will between O & V 
are replaced by justified resentment and indignation) 
(2) consequent upon (1) V experiences justified anger towards O and a breach in 
the hitherto cordial relations between O and V takes place 
(3) at tii O repents of the wrong; that is, O recognises the wrongness involved, 
displays sincere contrition and makes restitution to V 
(4) at tiii V forgives O 
(5) reconciliation between O and V occurs; that is, because of (3) and (4), O ceases 
to feel indignant and resumes warm personal relations with O. 
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Note, firstly, that the reconciliation which occurs at tiii has emotional and 
volitional implications for both O and V. For V it means the cessation of, the 
lifting of, justified anger against O and the resumption of cordial relations with 
the person who has wronged them. For O it involves the acknowledgment that a 
past action, for which they accept responsibility, was wrong; the forswearing of 
the performance of such actions in the future, and the grateful acceptance of 
renewed cordial relations with V on the basis of those understandings.     
Note, secondly, that sincere repentance - based reconciliation means that O and 
V now share, and know that they share, the same emotional and motivational 
attitude to the kind of behaviour that is exemplified by the wrong that occurred at 
ti.   
In recent decades this traditional conception of forgiveness has been challenged 
by radical conceptions of forgiveness which seek to expand the rather austere 
traditional understanding of forgiveness in a number of ways.  
Firstly, it has been argued that forgiveness, both direct and mediated, can occur 
between collectives as well as between individuals. Individuals can wrong other 
individuals, but collectives such as states, or nations, or communities or families 
also can wrong other individuals or collectives. Individuals can experience 
justified anger when contemplating wrongs which they have suffered, but so also 
can collectives. Thus estrangement  can occur not only between individuals but 
also between collectives, opening up the possibility that, granted appropriate 
repentance and reparations, forgiveness and reconciliation can occur. Collectives, 
as well as individuals, therefore can engage in wrongdoing and receive 
forgiveness.  
Secondly, and flowing from the first point, it has been argued that collective 
forgiveness can be understood as a political  concept as well as a moral concept. 
Aggrieved states, nations, communities and other collectives can identify past 
political wrongs which they have unjustifiably suffered and, in appropriate 
circumstances, can forgive offending collectives for the suffering, destruction and 
death that has flowed from their political actions and inactions. 
Thirdly, collective political forgiveness can transcend the temporal restrictions 
that constrain individual forgiveness because states, nations and communities 
enjoy collective political memories which span centuries. This is because 
aggrieved collectives view the sufferings of past generations as being, in some 
intelligible sense ‘their sufferings’, even though decades or centuries divide them 
from the living experiences of those who were originally wronged and the bonds of 
political identity which unite them to those who have suffered wrongly in the past 
remain alive and strong.  
Thus, it is argued, to view forgiveness as exclusively moral, as exclusively the 
preserve of individuals and as bounded by temporal restrictions is to ignore other 
important possible uses of the concept, thereby limiting its scope and power. Not 
only is the conceptual expansion intelligible, it is also of great importance: it can 
contribute to post – conflict reconstruction by creating more constructive 
relationships between old enemies and to the development of peace – building by 
healing the wounds that the sufferings of past generations have caused. 
The relationship between individual moral forgiveness and collective political 
forgiveness forms the central subject matter of this paper. I will try to construct a 
plausible account of collective political forgiveness, explore the philosophical 
integrity of crucial underlying concepts and reach tentative conclusions about 
whether or not political forgiveness is a sustainable concept.   
Sceptics have been quick to dismiss the extension of forgiveness which I have 
described in these opening paragraphs. They have typically argued that 
collectives do not exist in any philosophically interesting sense; that, even if 
collectives exist, they are incapable of moral agency; that, even if they exist and 
are capable of moral agency, they are incapable of experiencing the emotions 
which are necessary for the granting of and receipt of forgiveness. In short, 
collective forgiveness is a piece of moral fiction which, whatever ends it may 
serve, should be rejected.     
In this paper I will construct a plausible account of collective political forgiveness, 
explore and attempt to overcome the sceptical challenges that it generates and try 
to reach tentative conclusions concerning the feasibility of the concept.     
2. Some examples.  
Up to this point in the paper I have talked in the abstract about collective political 
forgiveness and it is now time to focus the discussion by introducing some 
examples of the issue under discussion. 
Example 1:  In the 1960s Martin Luther King urged American Africans to forgive 
white Americans for their sufferings under slavery and for the legacy of 
discrimination that continued through the 20th century.       
Example 2:  On December 7th 1970 German Chancellor Billy Brandt knelt on the 
ground at the Warsaw Ghetto Memorial and asked for forgiveness on behalf of the 
German people asked for forgiveness for the suffering caused by the German 
suppression of the Warsaw uprising of 1944;  again in 1994 President Hertzog 
asked for forgiveness. 
Example 3:  In 1994, in Christ Church Cathedral in Dublin, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, George Carey, asked for forgiveness from the Irish people for 
centuries of British wrongs against the people of Ireland; in 1995 Cardinal Daly 
visited Canterbury Cathedral and asked the British people for forgiveness in 
relation to Irish anti-British terrorist attacks in the late 20th century 
Example 4:  In 1995, in post-apartheid South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission was set up to encourage forgiveness and reconciliation between the 
different racial groups in the new South Africa. 
These thumb – nail sketches constitute only a few of the many cases that have 
received detailed attention in the literature of political forgiveness. They are 
sufficient, however, to intimate how very attractive the concept of political 
forgiveness has become.  Political forgiveness extends a familiar moral concept to 
wider contexts in striking and unusual ways, it promises to contribute to post-
conflict political reconstruction, it offers both solace to individuals and comfort to 
races, nations and states.  
In spite of these points we should recognise that the idea that a nation or a state 
or a community forgives another nation, state of community gives rise to a cluster 
of problems: sceptical doubts, both general and particular, stand in the way of 
the idea that collectives can grant or receive forgiveness. 
We should note, firstly, how greatly the examples differ in character: example 2 
relates to relations between states, whereas example 1 relates to relationships 
within a state; the experience of living under apartheid still lives vividly in the 
memories of many present day South Africans whereas there can be few who 
have personal experience of being a black American slave. These differences may 
or may not prove to be significant. 
We should note, secondly, that the idea that collectives -  nations or states or 
communities – can wrong each other, and, having repented, can forgive and be 
reconciled to each other – encounters widespread sceptical reactions which are 
both general and particular. Most generally we may worry about issues in 
ontology: do collectives exist or must reference to collectives simply be 
understood as complicated ways of referring to individual persons? Meta-ethical 
issues also arise: can moral agency be sensibly ascribed to collectives and the 
‘decisions’ which collectives supposedly make? Finally, even if the first two 
questions are settled in the affirmative, we must ask whether collectives can 
experience the emotions associated with moral anger, repentance and 
reconciliation which are presupposed when political forgiveness is attributed to 
them? 
All of these are rather abstract philosophical questions. However, they are 
questions which inevitably arise in the mind of any philosophically trained 
student of contemporary discussions about peace and reconciliation; and since 
they are questions about the framework within which discussions of political 
forgiveness are conducted they need to be addressed before discussions of the 
significance of particular acts of political forgiveness can properly be addressed.     
It is to these sceptical challenges that I shall now turn. 
Sceptical challenges i: the intelligibility of collective moral agency. 
A crucial issue in the great debate between collectivists and individualists 
concerns their respective ontologies: do collectives exist? and if they exist, can 
moral agency be intelligibly ascribed to them? Familiar sceptical arguments 
relating to the ontological issue are well known. Rugby teams exist. However 
although each team consists of fifteen players sceptics argue that there is no 
entity, the team, which exists over and above the players who make it up. Anyone 
who thinks that there is a distinct ontologically viable entity, the team, has a poor 
grasp on the nature of reality; and anyone who thinks that the team has 
responsibilities over and above the responsibilities of the individual members has 
a poor grasp on the nature of moral agency. So it is with nations and 
communities: they are nothing over and above the people who make them up. So 
the idea that nations or communities forgive each other is a conceptual 
confusion.  
It might seem natural to commence with the ontological question concerning the 
existence of collectives and proceed to meta-ethical questions as to whether moral 
agency can be ascribed to them. For reasons which will shortly become clear, 
however, I propose to reverse that order and commence by examining the 
ascription of moral agency to collectives. 
3. Attributing moral agency to collectives. 
One context in which the intelligibility of attributing moral agency to collectives 
arose was in the context of the business corporation and it was in that context 
that sceptical questions about its intelligibility were very clearly expressed. As 
citizens, businessmen have moral duties but as members of the executive boards 
of corporations they do not. The philosopher John Ladd expressed the argument 
thus: 
“It is improper to expect organisational conduct to conform to the ordinary 
principles of morality” he wrote , “ _ _ _ we cannot and must not expect formal 2
organisations or their representatives acting in their official capacities, to be 
hones, courageous, considerate, sympathetic, or to have any kind of moral 
integrity. Such concepts are not in the vocabulary, so to speak, of the 
organisational language game.”    
In this section I will develop three arguments, in ascending order of philosophical 
sophistication, which defend the projection of moral agency to collectives, in each 
case first developing the argument in a general form and then enquiring as to its 
relevance to the specific case of political forgiveness.  
The argument from particular instantiations. 
The first argument draws attention to the structural similarity between 
judgments which ascribe moral agency to individuals and to collectives. In lots of 
easily recognised contexts – I will draw upon examples from business, from 
medicine and from international affairs -  a range of basic moral distinctions, 
both deontic and aretic, will be shown to be applicable to collectives in ways 
which parallel the ways in which they are applied to individual moral agents. 
These include the distinction between behaviour which is permitted (ie. what is 
not morally wrong) and that which is forbidden (ie. that which is morally wrong), 
between behaviour which is forbidden and that which is obligatory (ie. failure to 
do which is morally wrong)  and between behaviour which is   obligatory and 
behaviour which is morally good (ie. which displays virtue fo character). So there 
is prima-facie evidence to suggest that moral agency is attributable to collectives; 
the burden of proof, I will suggest, is on the sceptic to show why moral agency 
should not also be attributed to collectives granted that our pre-theoretical 
judgments are as I have shown them to be. It is to these examples that I now 
turn.          
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Consider business contexts. Here distinctions between the forbidden, the 
permissible, the obligatory and the good are commonly made in relation to the 
collectives which are called ‘corporations’. It is morally forbidden that a 
corporation should seek competitive advantage by deceptive advertising; it is 
obligatory upon corporations to attempt, through fair employment practices, to 
improve race relations in large cities with a history of racial tension; it is 
recognised that corporations should ensure that patterns of virtuous ethical 
conduct are instilled into the workforce and embedded in business practice.      
Consider next the profession of medicine. Most people know little of medical 
science and so are at the mercy of the medical profession in matters which are of 
grave personal concern. Over the centuries, therefore, clearly understood ethical 
guidelines have developed concerning the treatment of patients and these are 
normally implemented, in different countries, by a national medical council. For 
example, the British Medical Association is responsible for overseeing the 
activities of the medical profession in the United Kingdom. As such, it is a 
collective body which exercises a form of moral agency. It identifies practices 
which are morally forbidden such as              ; it identifies practices which are 
morally obligatory such as                       ;  it inculcates professionally relevant 
and virtuous character traits such as    
  
My final example is drawn from the field of international relations, specifically 
from the relationships which hold between the free and sovereign members of the 
community of states and nations. The United Nations is a collective organisation 
which exercises moral agency in relation to members of the international 
community. Thus it outlaws      
aggression between member states in times of peace and attacks on non-
combatant populations in times of war; it identifies practices, such as the giving 
of economic aid or the sharing of scientific research findings, as being morally 
obligatory; it encourages virtuous character traits such as co-operation in all of 
the fields which come under its jurisdiction.  
The argument from the nature of responsibilities. 
Our central concern is moral projection: the rebuttal of scepticism and the 
defence of the ascription to collectives of moral agency. A second line of defence 
involves considering the central concept of moral responsibility and inquiring as 
to the conditions under which responsibility is attributed in its central cases. If it 
can be shown that attributions of responsibility can be attributed to collectives 
then this will provide strong grounds for defending projection in political 
contexts. To this task I shall now turn. 
Responsibility is typically ascribed in one or all of the following contexts. Issues of 
responsibility arise in contexts involving the ascription of praise and blame for 
past actions. Answering the question ‘who was responsible?’ involves tracing an 
event to its origin in the intentions, plans and decision of the person who initiated 
the sequence which culminated in the event in question. Responsibility, in this 
sense, involves identifying who is causally answerable for the action and 
assigning praise or blame to them. 
Responsibility ascriptions also arise in contexts where what is at stake relates to 
role playing; it consists in identifying the person or persons who should have 
roles assigned to them. ‘Who is responsible?’ here is answered by pointing to the 
relevant persons and explaining their role. It is parents who are responsible for 
their children, it is lawyers who are responsible for their clients.  
Finally, responsibility considerations feature in character evaluations. To simplify 
outrageously,  people are responsible if they are reliable and trustworthy. A 
responsible person is a person that you can depend on. ‘Is he a responsible 
person?’ is answered by the simple response: ‘Well, I would / would not welcome 
them taking charge of my affairs.’  
It should be noted that the roles which I have assigned to responsibility 
ascriptions presuppose some underlying value system and that they are 
consistent with a variety of different conceptions of value. A utilitarian will have a 
distinctive understanding of responsibility ascriptions, a neo-Kantian will have a 
different understanding, an intuitionist will have yet another understanding. 
However, all are consistent with the basic understanding of responsibility 
ascriptions which I have characterised.  
It should also be noted that we commonly ascribe responsibility to collectives in 
all of the contexts in which I have suggested that responsibility is at home. Thus 
we sometimes hear governments or large business corporations or professional 
group praised or (usually) blamed for their policies or actions; we sometimes hear 
it said that it is the responsibility of this or that government or corporation or 
professional group to decide what is to be done; we hear governments, business 
corporations and professional groups described as responsible or irresponsible 
depending on their tract record in relation to a particular sphere of activity.  
These considerations lend support to the idea that moral agency is attributable to 
collectives. 
The argument from conflicting obligations and responsibilities. 
We may commence our third and final defence of moral projection with an 
example.  
Jones is a member of a government - appointed committee overseeing the restructuring of medical 
provision in an area of the country which has experienced significant demographic change. The 
evidence provided to the committee strongly suggests a case for closing geriatric provision in a 
particular hospital and relocating it in a hospital some distance away. Similar closures in other 
areas have led to job loss in departments affected by the rationalisations and it seems that the 
impending closure of geriatrics will be no exception. Jones’ daughter is a doctor in the threatened 
geriatric department and so, although he is convinced of the reasonableness of the case for 
closure, family loyalties cause him to abstain when the vote is finally taken. He explains his 
decision by saying to himself: ‘there are some circumstances in which family comes first.’  
In a recent article  David Copp has argued that examples such as this support 3
what he calls the ‘Collective Moral Autonomy Thesis’ (CMA for short). According 
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to this thesis collective can have moral properties when some of the members of 
the collective do not have them; conversely, members of a collective can have 
moral properties when the collective does not have them.                            
CMA holds that collective moral agency is defensible provided that we accept a 
distinction between ‘pro tanto’ obligations and responsibilities and ‘all things 
considered’ obligations and responsibilities. Thus as the example illustrates we 
correctly assign obligations and responsibility to collectives in circumstances in 
which it would be a mistake to assign similar obligations and responsibility to 
specific members of the collective and vice – versa. 
Furthermore, since this is true, collectives are genuine moral agents to whom 
obligation and responsibility can be ascribed over an above the obligations and 
responsibilities of the collective members.  
Clearly the first step is the crucial one: why does Copp accept it? 
Copp’s reason is that collectives and the individuals who comprise them are 
distinct agents and face different moral situations. It might be the case, therefore, 
that a collective has an ‘all-things-considered’ obligation to do A and a member of 
the collective not have an ‘all-things-considered’ obligation to do A.  Family 
loyalties, promises made before becoming a member of the collective, or other 
special responsibilities get in the way. The precise reason is immaterial: the 
collective has an all-things-considered’ duty to do A and the member of the 
collective has no such duty.         
We may commence our third and final defence of moral projection by examining 
an interesting account of collectives, developed recently by David Copp which, if 
successful, meets both of the general sceptical arguments that I have just 
outlined.  
CMA holds that collective moral agency is defensible provided that we accept a 
distinction between ‘pro tanto’ obligations and responsibilities and ‘all things 
considered’ obligations and responsibilities. Thus as the example illustrates we 
correctly assign obligations and responsibility to collectives in circumstances in 
which it would be a mistake to assign similar obligations and responsibility to 
specific members of the collective and vice – versa. 
Furthermore, since this is true, collectives are genuine moral agents to whom 
obligation and responsibility can be ascribed over an above the obligations and 
responsibilities of the collective members.  
Clearly the first step is the crucial one: why does Copp accept it? 
Copp’s reason is that collectives and the individuals who comprise them are 
distinct agents and face different moral situations. It might be the case, therefore, 
that a collective has an ‘all-things-considered’ obligation to do A and a member of 
the collective not have an ‘all-things-considered’ obligation to do A.  Family 
loyalties, promises made before becoming a member of the collective, or other 
special responsibilities get in the way. The precise reason is immaterial: the 
collective has an all-things-considered’ duty to do A and the member of the 
collective has no such duty.         
 Before proceeding to such issues, however, an important preliminary clarification 
concerning the nature of collectives needs to be made. 
In his writings on collective responsibility  Peter French distinguishes between 4
aggregative and conglomerate collectives and argues that the latter qualifies as a 
moral person whereas the former does not. His distinction turns on identity 
conditions and is as follows. The identity of an aggregate collective consists in the 
sum of the identities of the persons who comprise the membership of the 
collective; it is the sum of the individual persons making it up. Every change in 
the membership of the collective is, therefore, a change in the identity of the 
collective. The identity of a particular collective rules out changes in its 
membership. Thus if one member of an aggregative collective AC had not been a 
member component of AC, the meaning of statements about AC would have been 
different. Consider, as examples of aggregative collectives, such groups of people 
as ‘the people who travelled on the 9am bus from Glasgow to Edinburgh on 1st 
August, 2009’ and ‘the people who witnessed the accident on the M8 motorway’. 
Such expressions are merely shorthand devices for referring to conjunctions of 
proper names and definite descriptions.  
By contrast, a collective is a conglomerate collective if the identity of the collective 
does not consist of the identity of the persons who are members of the it; that is 
to say, the same collective can exist even if the members change, even if they 
change continuously. This if statement Si is true of CCi at ti, then it would still 
have been true of CCi even if one or more of the members of CCi had been 
different from what they were at that time. For example, the expressions ‘the 
Board of Executive of Coca-Cola’ and ‘the Senate of the University’ refer to 
collectives which continue to exist, which act and which preserve their identity 
even though their membership changes over time. 
Conglomerate collectives have internal organisational, decision – making roles 
through which collective policies are formed and collective action is taken, 
aggregative collectives have not; conglomerate collectives invest internal power 
and responsibility in positions and not in people, thus allowing specified people to 
exercise power by virtue of occupying those roles, aggregative collectives do not; 
conglomerate collectives have standardised ways, peculiar to specific collectives, 
by which people become members of the collective, aggregative collectives do not; 
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and, finally conglomerate collectives recognise standards of conduct for the 
collective this allowing the development of collective traditions and collective 
character, aggregative collectives do not.  
As a consequence of these features, some statements about conglomerate 
collectives, involving saying that CCi did action Ai and that Ai was not performed 
by any individual member of CCi, are true. Furthermore, conglomerate collectives 
have decision structures, methods of policy formulation and recognised rules of 
procedure. And neither of these points applies to aggregative collectives.   
These points of clarification having been made, we can now proceed to the 
defence of the view that moral agency is attributable to at least some collectives, 
namely conglomerate collectives. I will advance three arguments in defence of this 
claim and return, in the light of them, to the issue of the ontological status of 
collectives. 
Sceptical challenges ii: attributing moral agency to collectives. 
Three arguments for attributing moral agency to conglomerate collectives. 
In this section I will develop three arguments, in ascending order of philosophical 
sophistication, which defend the projection of moral agency to conglomerate 
collectives (henceforth by ‘collective’ I will mean ‘conglomerate collective’). In each 
case I will first develop the argument in a general form and then enquire as to its 
relevance to the specific case of political forgiveness.  
The argument from particular instantiations. 
The first argument draws attention to the structural similarity between 
judgments which ascribe moral agency to individuals and to collectives. In lots of 
easily recognised contexts – I will draw upon examples from business, from 
medicine and from international affairs -  a range of basic moral distinctions, 
both deontic and aretic, will be shown to be applicable to collectives in ways 
which parallel the ways in which they are applied to individual moral agents. 
These include the distinction between behaviour which is permitted (ie. what is 
not morally wrong) and that which is forbidden (ie. that which is morally wrong), 
between behaviour which is forbidden and that which is obligatory (ie. failure to 
do which is morally wrong)  and between behaviour which is   obligatory and 
behaviour which is morally good (ie. which displays virtue fo character). So there 
is prima-facie evidence to suggest that moral agency is attributable to collectives; 
the burden of proof, I will suggest, is on the sceptic to show why moral agency 
should not also be attributed to collectives granted that our pre-theoretical 
judgments are as I have shown them to be. It is to these examples that I now 
turn.          
Consider business contexts. Here distinctions between the forbidden, the 
permissible, the obligatory and the good are commonly made in relation to the 
collectives which are called ‘corporations’. It is morally forbidden that a 
corporation should seek competitive advantage by deceptive advertising; it is 
obligatory upon corporations to attempt, through fair employment practices, to 
improve race relations in large cities with a history of racial tension; it is 
recognised that corporations should ensure that patterns of virtuous ethical 
conduct are instilled into the workforce and embedded in business practice.      
Consider next the profession of medicine. Most people know little of medical 
science and so are at the mercy of the medical profession in matters which are of 
grave personal concern. Over the centuries, therefore, clearly understood ethical 
guidelines have developed concerning the treatment of patients and these are 
normally implemented, in different countries, by a national medical council. For 
example, the British Medical Association is responsible for overseeing the 
activities of the medical profession in the United Kingdom. As such, it is a 
collective body which exercises a form of moral agency. It identifies practices 
which are morally forbidden such as              ; it identifies practices which are 
morally obligatory such as                       ;  it inculcates professionally relevant 
and virtuous character traits such as    
.    
My final example is drawn from the field of international relations, specifically 
from the relationships which hold between the free and sovereign members of the 
community of states and nations. The United Nations is a collective organisation 
which exercises moral agency in relation to members of the international 
community. Thus it outlaws      
aggression between member states in times of peace and attacks on non-
combatant populations in times of war; it identifies practices, such as the giving 
of economic aid or the sharing of scientific research findings, as being morally 
obligatory; it encourages virtuous character traits such as co-operation in all of 
the fields which come under its jurisdiction.  
The argument from the nature of responsibilities. 
Our central concern is moral projection: the rebuttal of scepticism and the 
defence of the ascription to collectives of moral agency. A second line of defence 
involves considering the central concept of moral responsibility and inquiring as 
to the conditions under which responsibility is attributed in its central cases. If it 
can be shown that attributions of responsibility can be attributed to collectives 
then this will provide strong grounds for defending projection in political 
contexts. To this task I shall now turn. 
Responsibility is typically ascribed in one or all of the following contexts. Issues of 
responsibility arise in contexts involving the ascription of praise and blame for 
past actions. Answering the question ‘who was responsible?’ involves tracing an 
event to its origin in the intentions, plans and decision of the person who initiated 
the sequence which culminated in the event in question. Responsibility, in this 
sense, involves identifying who is causally answerable for the action and 
assigning praise or blame to them. 
Responsibility ascriptions also arise in contexts where what is at stake relates to 
role playing; it consists in identifying the person or persons who should have 
roles assigned to them. ‘Who is responsible?’ here is answered by pointing to the 
relevant persons and explaining their role. It is parents who are responsible for 
their children, it is lawyers who are responsible for their clients.  
Finally, responsibility considerations feature in character evaluations. To simplify 
outrageously,  people are responsible if they are reliable and trustworthy. A 
responsible person is a person that you can depend on. ‘Is he a responsible 
person?’ is answered by the simple response: ‘Well, I would / would not welcome 
them taking charge of my affairs.’  
It should be noted that the roles which I have assigned to responsibility 
ascriptions presuppose some underlying value system and that they are 
consistent with a variety of different conceptions of value. A utilitarian will have a 
distinctive understanding of responsibility ascriptions, a neo-Kantian will have a 
different understanding, an intuitionist will have yet another understanding. 
However, all are consistent with the basic understanding of responsibility 
ascriptions which I have characterised.  
It should also be noted that we commonly ascribe responsibility to collectives in 
all of the contexts in which I have suggested that responsibility is at home. Thus 
we sometimes hear governments or large business corporations or professional 
group praised or (usually) blamed for their policies or actions; we sometimes hear 
it said that it is the responsibility of this or that government or corporation or 
professional group to decide what is to be done; we hear governments, business 
corporations and professional groups described as responsible or irresponsible 
depending on their tract record in relation to a particular sphere of activity.  
These considerations lend support to the idea that moral agency is attributable to 
collectives. 
The argument from conflicting obligations and responsibilities. 
We may commence our third and final defence of moral projection with an 
example.  
Jones is a member of a government - appointed committee overseeing the restructuring of medical 
provision in an area of the country which has experienced significant demographic change. The 
evidence provided to the committee strongly suggests a case for closing geriatric provision in a 
particular hospital and relocating it in a hospital some distance away. Similar closures in other 
areas have led to job loss in departments affected by the rationalisations and it seems that the 
impending closure of geriatrics will be no exception. Jones’ daughter is a doctor in the threatened 
geriatric department and so, although he is convinced of the reasonableness of the case for 
closure, family loyalties cause him to abstain when the vote is finally taken. He explains his 
decision by saying to himself: ‘there are some circumstances in which family comes first.’  
In a recent article  David Copp has argued that examples such as this support 5
what he calls the ‘Collective Moral Autonomy Thesis’ (CMA for short). According 
to this thesis collective can have moral properties when some of the members of 
the collective do not have them; conversely, members of a collective can have 
moral properties when the collective does not have them.                            
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An interesting account of the existence and moral status of collectives has 
recently been developed by David Copp which, if successful, meets both of the 
general sceptical arguments that I have just outlined.  
CMA holds that collective moral agency is defensible provided that we accept a 
distinction between ‘pro tanto’ obligations and responsibilities and ‘all things 
considered’ obligations and responsibilities. Thus as the example illustrates we 
correctly assign obligations and responsibility to collectives in circumstances in 
which it would be a mistake to assign similar obligations and responsibility to 
specific members of the collective and vice – versa. 
Furthermore, since this is true, collectives are genuine moral agents to whom 
obligation and responsibility can be ascribed over an above the obligations and 
responsibilities of the collective members.  
Clearly the first step is the crucial one: why does Copp accept it? 
Copp’s reason is that collectives and the individuals who comprise them are 
distinct agents and face different moral situations. It might be the case, therefore, 
that a collective has an ‘all-things-considered’ obligation to do A and a member of 
the collective not have an ‘all-things-considered’ obligation to do A.  Family 
loyalties, promises made before becoming a member of the collective, or other 
special responsibilities get in the way. The precise reason is immaterial: the 
collective has an all-things-considered’ duty to do A and the member of the 
collective has no such duty.         
The particular sceptical argument. 
One may accept Copp’s argument, or others like it, and recognise the existence of 
collectives and the intelligibility of collective moral agency but still refuse to 
accept the intelligibility of collective forgiveness. One’s reasoning might be as 
follows. Forgiving is an emotionally complex process and its inner workings –  for 
example whether it requires repentance or whether it necessarily issues in 
reconciliation – are the subject of considerable controversy. One aspect of 
forgiveness on which there is widespread agreement is the thesis that forgiveness 
involves the renunciation of anger. However, whatever else they may have, 
collectives do not have emotions: their constituent members may experience 
emotions but communities, nations, states do not have emotions. Consequently 
they cannot experience the emotion of anger; and consequently they cannot 
renounce anger, which it is the essence of forgiveness to do. Collective forgiveness 
is impossible. It will not do to reply, as Glenn Pettigrove replies, that the emotions 
felt by a significant minority, or even a majority, of a collective is sufficient for the 
ascription of the emotion to the collective. The whole point of Copp’s defence of 
collectives is that there is no necessary connection between what can be sad of 
the collective and what can be said of one or all of the members of the collective.  
I think that there is a convincing response to this objection.  
Although the renunciation of the emotion of anger is perhaps the primary 
evidence of forgiveness it is not the only one. Hostile behaviour is also a token of 
resentment and anger; and the removal of hostile behaviour, the replacing of 
hostile behaviour with friendly and co-operative behaviour is also a form that 
forgiveness can take. Now collectives can display different forms of behaviour and 
so can display shifts of behaviour from one form to another. It is here at the 
behavioural level, therefore, that collective forgiveness manifests itself. So 
collective forgiveness is no less real than collective forgiveness, though it may 
manifest itself in different forms.   
3. Assessing collective forgiving. 
I have defended the moral standing of collectives against some of the more 
obvious objections. In spite of this, qualms remain. To explore these a little 
further let us return to Mr. Blair and Cardinal Daly. It goes without saying that 
Cardinal Daly was not responsible for the acts of Irish terrorists that have caused 
so much heartache in recent times; it goes without saying that Mr. Blair was not 
responsible for responsible for the Irish Famine and the irresponsible British 
policies of the 1840s. So the sceptic about collective forgiveness is always at hand 
to query the intelligibility of the forgiveness which they grant and receive. 
Forgiveness involves the lifting of a sanction on a person upon whom the sanction 
properly rests for an offence committed. If the person who receives forgiveness is 
not responsible for the offence that is forgiven then, however skilfully we may 
defend the status of collectives, it will always seem as though the wrong people 
are acting in the drama. This, I think, is the point that the sceptic has grasped 
and is using to undermine collective forgiveness.  
Note that the issues raised by our two cases are different. The difficulties that Mr 
Blair’s case presents is the difficulty of seeing how forgiveness is possible across 
such enormous lengths of time; the difficulty that Cardinal Daly’s case presents 
is the difficulty of seeing how a person so remote from the deeds can take 
responsibility for them. Consider then how different these two cases are from the 
case of forgiveness being sought and granted in connection with the treatment of 
African blacks by white in the USA. Here the problem relates not so much to the 
constraints imposed by the passage of time or to the constraints imposed by 
moral distance but to the problem of how representative is the person who gives 
and receives the forgiveness. All three cases involve collective forgiveness on 
behalf of very large collectives and it worth noting that another significant 
distinction between forms of collective action, including collective forgiveness, can 
be made by reference to issues of scale. Families are collectives; and closely 
related families sometimes quarrel over perceived wrongs that one family has 
inflicted on the other in the past. Subsequent collective forgiveness in such cases 
is very different from the forms of collective forgiveness that we have been 
considering up to this point in the paper. So cases of collective forgiveness differ 
due to the different ways in which constraints of time, constraints of moral 
distance, constraints of democratic accountability and constraints of scale shape 
the collective forgiveness; and the kind of sceptical questions that we want to ask 
in connection with each kind of case differs considerably from the kinds of 
sceptical question which arise in the others. This throws light on the different 
ways in which collective forgiveness can fail, the different forms of criticism that it 
may be subjected to.        
NOTES: 
Formally expressed, therefore, traditional forgiveness (F) involves three temporally 
distinct sequences of events (ti, tii, tiii) featuring an offender (O), and a victim (V). 
Thus: 
A victim (V) forgives (F) an offender (O) if and only if: 
(1) at ti O wrongs V, at which point warmth, respect and good will between O & V 
are replaced by justified resentment and indignation) 
(2) consequent upon (1) V experiences justified anger towards O and a breach in 
the hitherto cordial relations between O and V takes place 
(3) at tii O repents of the wrong; that is, O recognises the wrongness involved, 
displays sincere contrition and makes restitution to V 
(4) at tiii V forgives O 
(5) reconciliation between O and V occurs; that is, because of (3) and (4), O ceases 
to feel indignant and resumes warm personal relations with O. 
The reconciliation which occurs at tiii has implications for both O and V: 
for O it means the lifting of, the cessation of justified anger, and the resumption 
of cordial relations with someone who has wronged him; for V it involves, both 
emotionally and volitionally, a shift of attitude to the kind of action exemplified by 
the wrong which occurred at ti; it also involves the restoration of the cordial 
relations with V which were damaged by the wrongdoing which occurred at ti.  
Even more importantly, however, reconciliation means that O and V now share 
the same attitude, emotionally and motivationally, to the kind of behaviour that is 
exemplified by the wrong that occurred at ti.   
     
  
     
